Arguments against the Concept of
‘Conjunct’/‘Disjunct’ in Tibetan

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Les concepts de « conjoint » et « disjoint » (en anglais: « conjunct »/« disjunct ») ont été introduits par Hale en 1980 pour décrire un patron très particulier d’indices personnels verbaux, en Newar, une langue tibéto-birmane. Des phénomènes analogues ont également été identifiés dans d’autres langues tibéto-birmanes, telles que les langues tibétiques, dérivées du vieux tibétain. Le but du présent article est d’expliciter les raisons pour lesquelles les concepts de conjoint et disjoint ne sont pas adéquats pour décrire le marquage de la personne en tibéto-birman. Une approche cognitive basée sur la notion sémantique et pragmatique d’égophorique lié à une connaissance personnelle et opposée aux autres médiatifs (sensoriel, inférentiel, etc.) rend mieux compte des faits linguistiques.

It is a great pleasure for me to offer this modest contribution in Roland Bielmeier’s honour. The work he has achieved in the field of Tibetan linguistics is monumental\(^1\), not only because of his own research but also because of his ability to organize and guide a major research team working on the Tibetan dialects at the University of Bern. This team has simply no match at the international level. It has already produced important publications on the following dialects: Balti (Bielmeier, 1985), South-Mustang (Kretschmar, 1986, 1995), Dingri (Herrmann, 1989), Nangchen (Causermann, 1989), Themchen (Haller, 2004), Shigatse (Haller, 2000), Sde.dge (Häsler, 1999), Spiti (Hein, 2001, forthcoming), Kyirong Lende (Huber, \(^1\) The scope of Roland Biemeier’s research of course extends well beyond Tibetan linguistics and concerns as well Caucasian and Iranian linguistics.)

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Most of the works mentioned above have been published in German in the series *Erzählungen und Dialekt*, Vereinigung für Geschichtswissenschaft Hochasiens, Wissenschaftsverlag in Bonn. These German publications have not received all the attention and recognition they deserve in the academic field of Tibetan linguistics and linguistics in general.

Another opus magnum carried out by the “Bern team” is of course The *Comparative Dictionary of Tibetan Dialects* (CDTD). It involved R. Bielmeier (project director), F. Haller, K. Häsl, C. Haller, V. Hein, B. Huber, Ngawang Tsering, M. Volkart, M. Zemp, D. Klapproth, R. Piva, A.-K. Röthlisberger-Beer, K. Wymann-Jespersen. The CDTD is divided in two volumes: a noun volume and a verb volume, and present data concerning about 60 Tibetan dialects. We hope to see soon the final publication of CDTD which will be of great help to all the researchers working in the fields of Tibetan phonology, lexicology, reconstruction of Proto-Tibetan and beyond.

Before examining the conjunct/disjunct opposition in Tibetan, I would like to make a point about the notion of ‘Tibetan dialects’. Based on my 20 years of field work throughout the Tibetan language area and on the existing literature, I estimate that there are 220 ‘Tibetan dialects’ derived from Old Tibetan and nowadays spread across 5 countries: China, India, Bhutan, Nepal and Pakistan. As I discuss in Tournadre (in progress), these dialects may be classed within 25 dialect groups, i.e. groups which do not allow mutual intelligibility. The notion of ‘dialect group’ is equivalent to the notion of language but does not entail any standardization. Thus if we set aside the notion of standardization, I believe it would be more appropriate to speak of 25 languages derived from Old Tibetan. This is not only a terminological issue but it gives an entirely different perception of the range of variation. When we refer to 25 languages, we make clear that we are dealing with a family comparable in size to the Romance family which has 19 groups of dialects. This perspective is quite

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2 The 19 groups of dialects or languages are Portuguese, Spanish, Asturian-Leonese, Aragonese, Catalan, Gascon, Provençal, Gallo-wallon, French, Nones-Cadorino, Friulian, Venetan, Lombardo, Corsican, Italian, Napolitan-Sicilian, Sardinian, Aromanian, Daco-Romance. See Dalby (2000). The differences between these languages within the Tibetan linguistic family are similar to those found within the Romance family between French, Italian, Spanish, Catalan or Portuguese, etc. They are more important than the differences between dialects such as Metropolitan Standard French and Quebec French,
different from dealing with several dialects of a single language. So I propose to adapt the terminology to reflect the linguistic diversity of the area and speak of *Tibetic languages* (or groups of dialects) derived from Old Tibetan. The 25 Tibetic languages include the following twelve major dialect groups: Ú-Tsang (China); Kham-Hor (T.A.R, Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan: China); Amdo (Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan: China); Thewo-Chone (Gansu, Sichuan: China); Ladakhi (Jammu Kashmir, India); Balti (Northwestern territories, Pakistan); Purki (Jammu Kashmir, India); Spiti (Himalchal, India); Dzongkha (Bhutan); Drenjong (Sikkim, India), Sherpa (Nepal; T.A.R, China); Kyirong-Kagate (Nepal and T.A.R, China).

In addition to these twelve major groups there are thirteen minor groups, which in some cases consist of only a single dialect. In most cases, the number of speakers is comprised between a few hundreds and a few thousands: Jirel (Nepal); Tsamang [also called Chochangacha] (Bhutan); Lakha (Bhutan); Dur (Bhutan); Mera-Sakteng (Bhutan); Zhongu (Sichuan: China); Gserpa (Sichuan: China); Khalong (Sichuan: China); Dongwang (Yunnan: China); Dhromo (T.A.R: China); Zitsadegu (Sichuan: China); Baima (Sichuan: China); Drugchu (Gansu: China).

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3 Just as we speak of Romance languages derived from Latin Languages. The same approach has led specialists of Chinese to speak of ‘Sinitic languages’ rather than ‘Chinese dialects’. Zeisler (2004) rightly uses the label ‘languages’ rather ‘dialects’ in her book (2004): *Relative Tense and Aspectual Values in Tibetan Languages*. The term Tibetic instead of Tibetan allows us to avoid ambiguity. Just as it is more usual and appropriate to speak of Romance languages rather than Latin or Germanic languages rather than German languages. The term Tibetic has been used with another meaning by Matišoff (1991, 2003:692) to group together Tamangic and Tibetan. This meaning of Tibetic has been propagated by the site of the Ethnologue (www.ethnologue.com). Dalby (1999/2000) uses Tibetic to designate a phylozone which groups together Tibetan, Tamang and Kinnauri, a grouping which corresponds more or less to Bodish which can be maintained in this sense. In our view, Tibetic is a very useful term to designate a very precise group of languages all directly derived from Old Tibetan. Tamangic and any other Bodish languages not derived from Old Tibetan are obviously not part of Tibetic, in our meaning.

4 For more details about this classification and other related issues, see Tournadre (2005a).
1 The various approaches to person marking in Tibetan

This having been said, let us consider the notion of *conjunct/disjunct* in Tibetic languages.

The purpose of this paper is to show that both the terms *conjunct/disjunct* and the underlying idea are actually *not* appropriate for Tibetic languages.

A lot of linguists who have worked extensively on Tibetic languages such as Bielmeier, van Driem, Garrett, Haller, Häsler, Huber, Sun, Tournadre, etc. have avoided both the terms and the notions in their description. Some authors who have used the notions in their previous works such as DeLancey are now convinced that they are not appropriate.

However, until now, there hasn’t been a publication which overtly states why it doesn’t work, which is important for people outside the field to be aware of. The rejection of *conjunct/disjunct* as a valid concept for the description of Tibetan has some implications for typological studies. The so-called ‘*conjunct/disjunct*’ patterns have sometimes been reified and analysed as specific systems that interact with evidentials. This is even the case in Aikhenvald’s comprehensive book devoted to evidentiality (2004). It seems that the author treats c/d patterns as “systems” distinct from “truly” grammatical evidential systems: “[…] *conjunct/disjunct* systems primarily mark speech-act participants, and demonstratives indicate spatial distance and anaphora. […] Historically, any evidentiality strategy, *except for demonstratives* and *conjunct/disjunct* person marking, can develop into a grammatical evidential” (2004: 146).

As we will see in the present article, the non-existence of such c/d systems in Tibetic languages has important consequences for the theory of evidentiality. It seems that the hot debates on the categories of evidentials and the definition of “evidentiality” are not over, as suggested by Guentchéva and Landaburu (eds) in their important contribution on Amerindian and Caucasian languages (2007: 3): “Le terme *evidentiality*
nous a posé problème. Bien que plusieurs auteurs de notre recueil utilisent les termes evidential, evidentiality, et même si l’usage de ces termes est maintenant assez répandu dans la littérature linguistique française, nous ne les reprenons pas à notre compte car ils sont source de confusion. […] La première critique que nous adressons à ces vocables est son emploi laxiste aussi bien en français qu’en anglais. Selon les cas, il s’applique à tout le champ que nous pouvons appeler épistémologique et donc aux dimensions 1 (validité, prise en charge, etc.), 2 (source, accès), 3 (saillance, admiratif, etc.) ou aux dimensions 2 et 3 ou seulement (et c’est là son emploi le plus précis) à la dimension 2 (source, accès).”

Let us now look at the so-called conjunct/disjunct pattern in Tibetic languages.

Sun (1993: 955) rightly pointed out that “in Tibetan, the category of person constitutes an important factor which determines much of the verbal morpho-syntax.” It is clear, by all means, that in Tibetic languages, person marking does not correspond to verb agreement with the subject as in Indo-European languages.

In order to explain the grammatical phenomena underlying person marking in Tibetan, the notion of conjunct/disjunct (hence c/d) first appeared in the 1980s for Newar, a Tibeto-Burman language. Let us recall the definition given by Hale in his study on Newar (1980: 87): “If the actor of the quote refers to the same individual as the actor of the quote frame, the verb of the quote is conjunct in form”. Conjunct is also used in declarative sentences when the actor is the speaker and in direct questions when the actor is the addressee. Thus we have in fact 3 different usages, which I will label hereafter ‘declarative c/d pattern’, ‘interrogative c/d pattern’ and ‘quotative c/d pattern’. Let us illustrate the three types from DeLancey’s examples (1990: 295).

(1) **ngə bod=pa yin**  
I Tibetbe{Conjunct} 
“I am a Tibetan”

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8 Or as DeLancey formulates it: “it is clear that the conjunct/disjunct pattern does not represent person agreement in any ordinary sense (DeLancy, 1990: 296).

9 AUX (auxiliary), DAT (dative), EGO (egophoric), EGOint (intentional egophoric), ERG (ergative), EVID (evidential), FACT (factual), FUT (future), GEN (genitive), IMPF (imperfective), INTERR (interrogative), NEG (negation), NVOL (non volitional), PERF (perfect), PRES (present), PFV (Perfective), SENS (sensory), EPI (epistemic marker).
(2) \textit{kho bod=pa red}
He Tibetan be(Disjunct)
“He is a Tibetan”

These two examples illustrate the declarative c/d pattern, while the two examples below illustrate the ‘interrogative c/d pattern’:

(3) \textit{khyed=rang bod=pa yin pas}
you Tibetan be \textit{INTERR} \textit{(Conjunct)}
“Are you a Tibetan?”

(4) \textit{nga rgya=mi red pas}
I Chinese be \textit{INTERR} \textit{(Disjunct)}
“Am I a Chinese?”

The ‘quotative c/d pattern’ may be illustrated as follows:

(5) \textit{khos kho bod=pa yin zer gyis}
He(\textit{erg}) he Tibetan be(Conjunct) say-\textit{IMPF/Disjunct}
“He says that he is a Tibetan”

(6) \textit{khos kho bod=pa red zer gyis}
He(\textit{erg}) he Tibetan be(Disjunct) say-\textit{IMPF/Disjunct}
“He says that he is a Tibetan”

It is interesting to note that some authors may retain only two patterns in their definition. That is the case of Aikhenvald (2004:391) who gives the following definition of c/d: “1st “person-marking on the verb whereby first person subject in statements is expressed in the same way as second person in questions, and all other persons are marked in a different way (also used to describe cross-clausal coreference).” In the above definition, the ‘quotative pattern’ is only mentioned in parenthesis\textsuperscript{11}, which is surprising since “Hale’s conjunct/disjunct terminology is inspired by the use of the endings in complement clause of verba dicendi […]” (DeLancey, 1990:295).

The c/d opposition was popularized in Tibetan by Scott DeLancey in various of his articles (1986, 1990, 1992): “Lhasa conjunct/disjunct evidentiality system is the most elaborate [that he knows of]” (1992:57). Three important questions concerning the concept of c/d should be addressed:

\textsuperscript{10} The gloss ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ have been added in the six examples.
\textsuperscript{11} The parenthesis is unclear. Is it an extension of the definition or a distinct meaning of c/d?
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1) Is the opposition between ‘first person marking’ and ‘non-first person marking’ in Tibetic languages mainly a syntactic problem of coreference or does it primarily depend on semantic and pragmatic factors?

2) Does this opposition function in a similar way in the various Tibetic languages?

3) What is the relationship between the opposition conjunct/disjunct and evidentiality?

It is obviously impossible to address these questions exhaustively within a short paper, and I wish rather to start a reflection on these issues. Let us look at some descriptions of Tibetic languages and see in what way the ‘c/d’ opposition has been treated. Given the number of articles dedicated to Tibetan, it is difficult to present all the approaches but the authors that I selected represent the main trends.

DeLancey (1990: 293) in his important article “Ergativity and the cognitive model of event structure in Lhasa Tibetan” gives the following analysis of Lhasa Tibetan verb endings: pa *red* disjunct perfective, pa *yin* conjunct perfective, gis disjunct imperfective, gi *yod* conjunct imperfective, gi *yod pa red* inferential imperfective, gi *red* disjunct future, gi *yin* conjunct future, song evidential perfective, zhaqg evidential perfect, byung perfective with speaker as Goal.

This analysis raises a few questions: firstly, gis is simply glossed as disjunct and not as expressing direct observation, which is a fundamental characteristic of this marker. Conversely, song is glossed as evidential, while it could also be marked as disjunct. Secondly, the notion of intentionality or ‘volitionality’ is not mentioned in this analysis, although it plays a major role in the system. This role is recognized by most authors (see below the presentations of Haller, Sun and Driem) and by DeLancey himself: “[…] the conjunct/disjunct distinction takes on new significance when the semantic parameter of volitionality comes into the picture. The clue to the essential nature of the opposition in the verbal system lies in the restriction of conjunct marking to volitional clauses.” (1990: 300).

Elaborating on his insightful cognitive model of event structure, De-
Lancey (1990:302) even comes to consider “volitionality distinction as reducible to an evidential one”, which is very convincing\textsuperscript{14}.

Thirdly, the rather peculiar gloss of byung ‘perfective with speaker as goal’, compared to the other glosses\textsuperscript{15}, suggests that the author felt a little uneasy with the position of this morpheme within the system. On the one hand, he considers that conjunct marking is restricted to volitional clauses (1990:300), but on the other hand, he shows that the morpheme byung “occurs only in clauses in which a conjunct participant plays the role of spatial, Dative, Experiencer, or Patient Goal” (ibid.). Although byung is linked to a ‘conjunct participant’, Delancey does not interpret it as conjunct proper. The reason for this is probably that it would create two conjunct markers (volitional and non volitional conjuncts).

It appears from some remarks in the article that DeLancey was not satisfied with the notion of conjunct. He notes for example that both conjunct and disjunct forms can occur with first person, and admits that Lhasa Tibetan “diverges from the conjunct/disjunct pattern” and that the “distinction is based on some semantic factor other than person” (1990:296). Let us examine DeLancey’s examples:

\begin{align*}
(7) & \text{ngar dngul tog-tsam yod} \\
& \text{I (DAT) money some exist(Conjunct)}\textsuperscript{16} \\
& \text{“I have some money”}
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
(8) & \text{khor dngul tog-tsam ’dug} \\
& \text{he (DAT) money some exist(Disjunct)} \\
& \text{“He has some money”}
\end{align*}

(7) and (8) correspond to the ‘declarative c/d pattern’, i.e. the first person subject is in the conjunct form while the third person subject is in the disjunct form. The example (9) is a perfectly valid sentence “in the context

\textsuperscript{14} Linguists who consider that there are clear-cut borders between grammatical categories will perhaps not like this statement. For example, Aikhenvald (2004) considers that modality and evidentiality should in theory be totally distinct categories. If we generally agree with this statement, it should be refined. DeLancey’s cognitive model of event structure who considers volitionality distinction as reducible to an evidential one, clearly shows that volitional modality can be integrated in the parameters of evidentiality.

\textsuperscript{15} Unlike the other markers which are glossed by grammatical terms: conjunct, disjunct, evidential, etc., byung is glossed byung in the examples of his article.

\textsuperscript{16} The gloss ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ have been added.
in which the speaker has just reached into his pocket and discovered some money that he had not known he had” (DeLancey, 1990: 296). However, it is a clear violation of the standard c/d pattern, since the so called disjunct form appears with the first person subject.

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(9) \quad \text{ngar dngul tog-tsam 'dug} \\
\quad \text{I (DAT) money some exist(Disjunct)} \\
\quad \text{“I have some money”}
\]

Although DeLancey notes the “divergence” from the c/d pattern, he uses the above examples to justify that “the conjunct/disjunct pattern does not represent person agreement in any ordinary sense” (1990: 296) rather than to dismiss the notion of conjunct. The author goes on writing: “On my current understanding of the system, yin and yod are used with propositions which are integrated with the speaker’s personal understanding of the world, red with generic statement and ‘dug with new knowledge” (1990: 297).

In this important summary, the c/d pattern is absent.

It is interesting to note that even in Newar, for which the terms conjunct/disjunct were coined, they are also problematic. Hargreaves (2005: 5) is now reluctant to use this terminology: “[…] Newar scholarship has sometimes used the terms âtma ‘self’ and para ‘other’ […]. The motivation for the terms conjunct/disjunct followed from the coreference properties of the morphology in certain logophoric contexts, in particular, reported speech. With some reluctance, I have chosen to continue using the terms conjunct/disjunct since they are the most widely used terms in English language scholarship. … […] The Newar terms âtma ‘self’ and para ‘other’ are in many ways more transparent in their notional characterization “self/other” than the terms conjunct/disjunct, which highlight the structural rather than notional properties.”

Hargreaves’ brilliant article on Newar shows that evidentiality in this language can not be described in terms of c/d patterns. Most of the examples he gives are in fact violations of the c/d pattern. It is an unfortunate choice to continue using these

\[\text{17 The italics are mine.}\]
\[\text{18 Newar belongs to the Tibeto-Burman macrofamily, but its classification remains problematic. It is only remotely related to the Tibetic family. Incidentally, the terms âtma ‘self’ and para ‘other’ are identical to the terms rang ngos ‘self’ and gzhan ngos ‘other’, proposed by Kesang Gyurme (1992) for Tibetan.}\]
terms since it perpetuates their use, particularly by scholars who are not familiar with their limitations.

Among the authors that have used the concepts of c/d, we also find Schöttelndreyer (1980) who described Sherpa, a Tibetic language. His analysis is similar to Hale’s analysis. Schöttelndreyer uses the three types of c/d patterns (declarative, interrogative and “indirect quotation”) to demonstrate the existence of a c/d pattern in Sherpa. The author noticed that the c/d pattern does not apply to indirect quotation of questions, a restriction which is not predicted by the c/d model: he declares at the end of the article: “Indirect quotation of question is not natural in Sherpa. Hale has also discovered that in Newari indirect quotation of questions is highly unnatural and that examples (42)–(46) of his 1971 paper are rejected in favour of their more natural direct quotation by most of his informants. Informants agree that they are grammatical, but not natural, not used.” (Schöttelndreyer 1980:129).

Let us now turn to other authors who have proposed alternative analysis of the same phenomenon. Several previous authors have suggested that the terms c/d are not helpful.

In his work on Lhasa evidentials, Edward Garrett speaks of ‘Ego evidentiality’: “Without question the most unusual and complex type of evidentiality in Tibetan is ego evidentiality. In his survey of evidential languages, de Haan (1998) finds no other (unrelated) languages to have ego evidentials. Within Bodic languages, however, such evidentials are common indeed, and from what we can tell they behave quite similarly from language to language”. Garrett goes on to criticize the use of the c/d distinction in Tibetan: “Following Hale, some work on Tibetan has adopted the terms ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’, which is regrettable if understandable. Once the initial motivation for the names is forgotten, the terms are somewhat opaque. Also, for a language like Tibetan, in which the evidential opposition is ternary (ego, direct, and indirect) rather than binary, as in Newari, two terms do not suffice” (Garrett: 2001, p. 209 footnote 66).

Let us now examine Haller’s analysis in his two major works on Shigatse (Ü-Tsang) dialect and Themchen Amdo dialect (Haller, 2000, 2004). Haller makes use of the following verbal categories: ‘Transitivität’ (transi-

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19 The italics are mine.
tivity), ‘Kontrollierbarkeit’ (controllability), ‘Volitionalität’ (volitionality) and ‘Evidentialität’ (evidentiality).

‘Volitionalität’ is defined as follows in Haller (2000: 86): “Ein Geschehen wird hier als volitional bezeichnet, wenn es mit der Absicht des Sprechers vonstatten geht.”

In Haller (2004: 136) we find the following development: “Ein Verb wird volitional markiert, wenn das Geschehen, das es beschreibt, in der Aussage mit der Absicht des Sprechers und in der Frage (in der Annahme der Sprechers) mit der Absicht des Befragten vonstatten geht oder ging.”

The author rightly distinguishes between ‘Kontrollierbarkeit’ (controllability) which is a lexical category of the verb and ‘Volitionalität’ (volitionality), which is conveyed by the auxiliary verb and linked to the pragmatic use of the verb in an utterance. This distinction is fundamental in Tibetic languages and it is used by other members of the “Bern team” such as Huber (2002: 115). A controllable verb may be used with volitional as well as non-volitional auxiliaries, while a non-controllable verb may only be used with non-volitional auxiliaries.

For ‘Evidentialität’ (evidentiality), Haller gives the following definition in 2000 (p. 89): “Ein Geschehen wird hier als evidentiell bezeichnet, wenn

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20 “An event will be characterized as volitional when it has occurred with the speaker’s intention.”

21 “A verb is marked as volitional when the event, that is described in the statement, occurs or has occurred with the speaker’s intention or in a question (in the speakers supposition), with the addressee’s intention”.

22 The opposition between controllable and non-controllable verbs applied to Tibetan was already used by Betty Shefts Chang and Kun Chang in 1980.

23 In my own terminology, ‘kontrollierbares Verb’ (controllable verb) corresponds to ‘volitional verb’ and ‘volitionales Hilfsverb’ (volitional auxiliary) corresponds to ‘intentional auxiliary’. The terms are different but the analysis is here identical. I recall many fruitful discussions and debates with Roland Biemel on these issues. In my later works, I have also come to use the term ‘controllable’ along with ‘volitional’. I now think the term ‘controllable’ is better suited than volitional (for the lexical category) because, unlike volitional, the term controllable puts the emphasis on the potential for control. It is also more convincing to label verbs of affect such as dga, “to love”, sens pa shor “fall in love”, as ‘non-controllable’ than to label them as ‘non-volitional’. An intermediate category of partly controllable verbs should also be introduced in order to describe the fluid functioning of some verbs, (mostly physiological) such as “to cough”, “to belch”, “to yawn”, “to sneeze”, “to laugh”, “to cry”, “to fart”, “to vomit”, corresponding to acts that can be partly controlled. See Jackson S. T. (1993: 962), Tournadre (2003).
es vom Sprecher direkt wahrgenommen wird”\(^\text{24}\) and gives a more elaborate definition in 2004 (p. 136): “Ein Verb wird evidentiell markiert, wenn das Geschehen, das es beschreibt, in der Aussage vom Sprecher und in der Frage (in der Annahme des Sprechers) vom Befragten direkt wahrgenommen wird oder wurde”.

Thus, in order to describe the auxiliary systems\(^\text{25}\) of Shigatse and Amdo, Haller proposes the following analysis and distinguishes three paradigms according to tense and aspect:

1) Volitional evidentiell (“volitional evidential”),
2) Nicht-volitional evidentiell (“non-volitional evidential”),
3) Nicht-evidentiell (“non-evidential”).

For example, if we consider the perfective forms alone, we find respectively for Themchen Amdo (2004: 137):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Volitional Evident</th>
<th>Non Volitional Evident</th>
<th>Non Evidental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perfective Ia(^\text{26})</td>
<td>1) jo</td>
<td>2) jokä</td>
<td>3) jozęç</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfective Ib</td>
<td>1) nojän</td>
<td>2) noře</td>
<td>3) nojänzęç</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfective II</td>
<td>1) a</td>
<td>2) tha</td>
<td>3) zęç</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is one substantial difference between the analyses proposed by Haller for Shigatse and for Themchen Amdo. In the case of Shigatse, Haller (2000: 90) introduced the distinction between Identität (identity) and Nicht-Identität (Non-identity) which he defines as follows: “Unter Identität wird hier die Identität des Sprechers beziehungsweise des Befragten mit dem Subjekt verstanden.”\(^\text{27}\) The notion of identity thus defined was rather similar to ‘conjunct’ although Haller did not use this term. In his subsequent work on Themchen Amdo, he dropped the notion

\(^{24}\) “An event is marked as ‘evidential’ when the speaker has directly perceived it.”

\(^{25}\) I will use in this article the term ‘auxiliary verbs’, although they rather correspond to suffixes in synchrony, as shown by Zeisler (2004). However, since evidentiality is mainly conveyed by forms which correspond diachronically to auxiliary verbs, it is more convenient to keep the term of ‘auxiliary’ which is used by most authors.

\(^{26}\) In my terminology, this corresponds to a perfect and not a perfective, since the past event is relevant to the moment of utterance.

\(^{27}\) “Under ‘identity’ we understand the identity of the speaker or the (asked) hearer with the subject.”
of Identität. The author did not explain why he changed his analysis but it is probably not because Amdo and Shigatse systems are fundamentally different in this respect (see Sun, 1993). The most probable explanation is that he considered this notion superfluous, since ‘identity’ only differed from ‘non-identity’ for the parameter of ‘volition’. The two other combinations were not sensitive to ‘identity’.

There are several ways in which Haller’s three-fold analysis of both Themchen and Shigatse could be refined.

First, the term ‘evidential’ is a rather broad notion and would need to be more narrowly specified since, in Haller’s view, it applies both to direct observation and to intentional actions, including those that have not taken place (such as ‘volitional evidential’ in the future).

Second, this analysis does not reflect the fact that some verbal endings (such as /jo/, /naJo/, /a/) are indeed more specifically bound to the first person subject.

Third, the markers labelled ‘nicht-volitional evidentiell’ are indeed non volitional when used with the 1st person, but they are neutral when used with 2nd or 3rd persons, i.e. they may be non volitional or volitional, as we will see in the following example (Haller, 2004: 153)

(10) kʰorge lopkʰają naga waj-Jul-tʰa
    er Klassenraum hinein geh-PVF-AUX-NVOL.EVID
    “Er kam (zu mir) in den Klassenraum.”
    (He came (to me) in the classroom.)

The verb waj-Juŋ (CT: bud yong) is glossed as “non volitional evidential”, while it is clear that the marker tʰa is neutral for volitionality when used with the 3rd person, as it also appears from Haller’s translation. In the above example, the person intentionally came in the classroom.

These minor problems do not have a fundamental impact on Haller’s excellent descriptive works on Themchen Amdo and Shigatse Tsang, because of the high number of examples and the texts he provides with glosses and translations.

Jackson Sun (1993) in his reference article on Mdzo-dge Amdo evidentials takes a different approach. He makes a distinction between ‘direct

28 Let us recall that these two Tibetic languages are not mutually intelligible.
evidential’, ‘immediate evidential’, ‘indirect evidential’ and ‘quotative’, but Sun (1993:955) adds: a “referentially fluid dichotomous distinction between ‘self-person’ and ‘other person’ [...] of the traditional first person, however, the self person is not deictically bound to the speaker; rather it is appropriate not only in first person statements, but also second person (non rhetorical) questions, as well as in certain quotes.”

In a long footnote, Sun carefully explains that “[the terms ‘self person’ and ‘other person’] are related to, but not identical with, the structurally-based labels ‘conjunct’ vs ‘disjunct’. [...] The terms ‘conjunct’ and ‘disjunct’ are incidentally, utterly unrevealing because although the nomenclature appears to be based on structural co-reference of the matrix and complement clause subjects (i.e. ‘conjunct’ if they are co-referent, ‘disjunct’ if otherwise), co-reference is actually relevant only when the subject of the complement clause is portrayed as a volitional actor. [...] Since the distinction involves more than mere structural co-reference, more self-evident labels should be sought, probably along the lines of such semantically-based terms as shenzhi ‘thoroughly integrated knowledge’ [...] quezhi ‘positive knowledge’ or Tournadre’s term egophoric” (1993: footnote 15, 955–956).

Let us now turn to George van Driem’s analysis of Dzongkha, the national language of Bhutan. In his reference Dzongkha grammar as in more recent works on Dzongkha, van Driem, another accomplished scholar of Tibeto-Burman languages, wisely chooses not to use the term conjunct/disjunct, although Dzongkha verbal morphosyntactic patterns function in a similar way as the other Tibetic languages mentioned above (Lhasa Tibetan, Shigatse, Mdzod-dge Amdo, Themchen Amdo). For example, 1st person subject in statements are expressed in the same way as second person in direct questions (Driem, 1998:140). Dzongkha thus includes constructions which could – following the patterns Hale described for Newar – be described as ‘declarative and interrogative c/d patterns’. However, the author wisely chooses instead to make use of the following categories: ‘personal knowledge’, ‘objective knowledge linked to (direct) observation’30. He also introduces the opposition between ‘assimi-

29 Sun’s ‘indirect evidential’ corresponds to Haller’s ‘nicht evidentiell’ (non evidential). It is a difference in the terminology rather than in the notions.

30 This applies to the verbs yod and ’dug. The expression ‘witnessed activity’ also appears in the text.
lated (or ingrained) knowledge’ and ‘newly acquired knowledge’ terms which have also been used by other authors such as DeLancey (1986, 1990), Sun (1993), Huber (2002). It is clear that ‘personal knowledge’ and ‘assimilated knowledge’ on the one hand, ‘newly acquired knowledge’ and ‘observation’ overlap in a complex way, but the author does not detail the relationship between these two dichotomies. However, it seems from Driem’s description that Dzongkha marks both oppositions.

In my own work on Lhasa Tibetan (Tournadre, 1991, 1992, 1996a, 2003) and on other Tibetic languages (1996b, 2001), I have also avoided use of the c/d opposition. Here is the analysis I present in the Manual of Standard Tibetan (Tournadre and Dorje, 2003: 166–170, 462):

pa red assertive (or factual) perfective, pa yin intentional egophoric perfective, gis testimonial (or sensory) imperfective, gi yod I intentional egophoric imperfective, gi yod II: habitual egophoric imperfective, gi yod red assertive (or factual) imperfective, gi red assertive (or factual) future, gi yin intentional egophoric future, song testimonial (or sensory) perfective, bzhag inferential perfect, yod red assertive (or factual) perfect, yod intentional egophoric perfect byung receptive egophoric perfective, myong experiential egophoric, dgos allocentric egophoric future, yong ‘warning future’.

‘Egophoric’ expresses personal knowledge or intention on the part of the actual speaker, or, in the case of direct questions, expresses the next speaker’s (the addressee’s) personal knowledge or intention, as anticipated by the actual speaker. It may also, in the case of reported speech,

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31 This applies for example to the opposition between in (‘assimilated knowledge’) and in pas (newly acquired knowledge).

32 For the sake of comparison, the list is presented as in DeLancey (1990), see above.

33 I have so far used the term assertive for the forms pa red, gi yod red, yod.red and gi red, but I now prefer to use the term ‘factual’ proposed by Oisel (forthcoming). Aikhenvald (2004) uses the term “assumptive” to refer to this kind of marker. However, I prefer to use ‘factual’ because the above 4 markers refer to information which is normally 100% certain. The verb “assume” and its derivation “assumptive” in English may suggest some uncertainty. Garrett (personal communication) agrees that ‘factual’ is better suited than “assumptive”. However, he points out that the perfect yod.red is normally compatible with epistemic weakening adverbs, unlike ‘dug’ (Garrett, 2001). Thus in some usages of yod.red, the term ‘assumptive’ would be quite appropriate.

34 The term testimonial may replaced by ‘sensory’ which is used by Aikhenvald (2004). I also used ‘sensorial’ in “Tournadre (2001).

35 The personal knowledge or intention of the hearer is assumed by the actual speaker.
indicate the personal knowledge or intention of the quoted speaker as interpreted by the actual speaker. Egophoric auxiliaries are used with the first person occurring overtly, covertly or by anticipation\textsuperscript{36}, regardless of its function in a given clause (subject, object, indirect object, locative complement, etc.). Final auxiliary verbs include several kinds of egophoric: intentional, receptive, habitual, experiential and allocentric\textsuperscript{37}. Finally, egophoric forms are used only when an auxiliary verb features in the main clause, but usually not in subordinate clauses (see also Garrett, 2001).

The notion of egophoric is very similar to ‘personal knowledge’ (Driem, 1998, DeLancey, 1990), ‘self-person’ (Sun, 1993), ‘personal experience’ (Huber, 2002), ‘ego evidentiality’ (Garrett, 2001), ‘speaker’s involvement’ (Hein, forthcoming).

It is important to note that the various egophoric auxiliaries may have different scopes. For example, in Standard Tibetan, the egophoric intentional perfective pa-yin can be used only with a 1\textsuperscript{st} person subject, the egophoric receptive byung can be used with 1\textsuperscript{st} person subject, direct object, indirect object or locative complement.

In Tournadre (2005b), I introduced a difference between narrow scope egophoric and wide scope egophoric in my analysis of Standard Tibetan. The examples below illustrate the difference between the egophoric scopes\textsuperscript{38}. The intentional egophoric pa.yin has narrow scope, which is acceptable in (11), but not in (12):

\hspace{1cm}

\textsuperscript{36} Thus the vast majority of egophoric occurrences is linked with the presence of a 1\textsuperscript{st} person in the sentence. The egophoric are linked with the 2\textsuperscript{nd} person in the case of direct question by anticipation of the answer which normally uses a 1\textsuperscript{st} person. In some rare examples, egophoric occurs in a sentence where the 1\textsuperscript{st} person is overtly absent but such sentences suppose an underlying 1\textsuperscript{st} person or the speaker’s intimate knowledge.

\textsuperscript{37} This term (which I would trade for a better one) refers to an action which the speaker proposes to achieve for the hearer’s benefit.

\textsuperscript{38} The idea of a difference in scope was suggested by Garrett (2001:107) who used the terms “strong ego” and “weak ego”. Although he did not speak in term of scope and formulated his analysis in a different way, Garrett was the first to draw my attention to this type of restriction. In his comments about the present article, he proposed as an alternative to ‘narrow scope egophoric’ and ‘wide scope egophoric’ respectively: ‘strict scope egophoric’ and ‘loose scope egophoric’ in order to avoid a syntactic reading of ‘scope’. In any case, further research is needed on a precise definition of ‘egophoric scope’.
(11)  nga-s mo.Ta btang-pa.yin  
I-ERG car  drive-PFV+EGoint  
“I drove the car”

(12)  *nga-'i bu.mo-s mo.Ta btang-pa.yin  
I-GEN daughter+ERG car  drive-PFV+EGoint  
“My daughter drove the car”

Depending on the context, suitable sentences would be: nga’i bu.mo-s mo.Ta btang-song (sensory); nga’i bu.mo-s mo.Ta btang-pa.red (factual); nga’i bu.mo-s mo.Ta btang-bzhag (inferential).

Unlike the intentional egophoric, gi.yod the ‘habitual egophoric’ has wide scope and may be used with 3rd person subject:

(13)  nga-s mo.Ta btang-gi.yod  
I+ERG car  drive- IMPF+EGO int./ EGOhabitual  
“I drive the car” (now/usually).

(14)  nga-'i bu.mo-s mo.Ta btang-gi.yod  
I-GEN daughter-ERG car  drive- IMPF+EGOhabitual  
“My daughter (usually) drives the car”.

The scope of egophoric evidentials may also vary in the different Tibetic languages\(^\text{39}\).

In summary, we have seen that many authors who have worked extensively on Tibetic languages such as Bielmeier, van Driem, Garrett, Haller, Häslar, Hein, Huber, Sun, Tournadre, etc. have avoided both the terms and the notions in their description.

2 Parameters of Tibetic evidential systems

Let us now summarize the various parameters that intersect in the Tibetic evidential systems: source of information, access to information, time of acquisition and volitionality.

\(^{39}\) In the same way as the grammatical categories of ‘plural’ or ‘imperfective’ do not exactly coincide in various languages.
In Tibetan, evidential systems essentially indicate access to the information, but they also grammaticalize the time of acquisition (assimilated versus new information). Until now, information access and source have often not been clearly distinguished.

It seems very important in Tibetic languages since all the evidentials may be followed by a quotation marker. For example, in the past one can oppose in Standard Tibetan $V + song$ ‘sensory’; $V + bzhag$ ‘(sensory) inferential’; $V + pa.red$ ‘factual’ which all refer to the information access of the speaker $S^0$, and: $V + song-za$ ‘sensory’-‘quotative’; $V + bzhag-za$ ‘inferential’-‘quotative’; $V + pa.red-za$ ‘factual’-‘quotative’, which refer to information access of a distinct source: the quoted speaker ($S^1$).

### 3 Arguments to refute the notion of ‘conjunct’/‘disjunct’

The conjunct/disjunct opposition as we have seen in the first section, comes from a syntactic approach and is based on a coreference pattern. The various alternative explanations referring to ‘personal knowledge’,

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40 Personal knowledge or intention are accessible to the speaker through his own awareness (and not through sensory channels).
‘personal experience’, ‘personal fact’\textsuperscript{41}, ‘self-person’, ‘self-centered’\textsuperscript{42}, ‘ego evidential’, ‘speaker’s involvement’ and ‘egophoric’ are driven by semantic, pragmatic and cognitive concepts, accounting for a broader range of elements of language use, as we will see below.

Returning now to Hale’s original description of the c/d distinction in Newari, let us examine how the author proposes to unify the three types of c/d patterns (namely, the declarative, the interrogative and the quotative types) within a single notion.

Let us recall that the coreference pattern is different for the three types (see examples (1)–(6)) it is respectively between the subject of the clause and the 1\textsuperscript{st} person (in declarative clause), between the subject of the clause and the 2\textsuperscript{nd} person (in direct question), and between the subject of the matrix clause and the subject of the complement clause corresponding to the quote. In the absence of such coreference, the form is called disjunct.

The coreference patterns correspond to different configurations, and the reduction of these three types as a single ‘conjunct’ construction is far from obvious. To justify unifying the three, Hale (1980) assimilated the ‘declarative conjunct pattern’ as a subcase of the ‘quotative conjunct pattern’ by saying that they both correspond to a coreference between “actor of the quote” and the “actor of the quote frame”. It was more difficult to integrate the ‘interrogative pattern’ and Hale had to posit “a coreference between the actor of the quote” and “the goal of the quote frame”. Thus, the conjunct pattern was not reducible to a single formulation and it could be justified only if we agree to assimilate the actor of the quote frame and the goal of the quote frame. Well aware of this problem, Hale (1980:99) conceded: “alternatively one might say that the conjunct-disjunct form of a true question anticipates that of its answer.”

The choice of accounting for the pattern of person marking in Newari or other Tibeto-Burman languages by using structural or syntactic tools, rather than semantico-pragmatic or cognitive notions, required complex syntactic models which are rather counterintuitive\textsuperscript{43}. It would be, mutatis

\textsuperscript{41} Caplow (2000).
\textsuperscript{42} Denwood (2000).
\textsuperscript{43} For example, it is counterintuitive to explain the syntax of the simple sentence as a subcase of the syntax of embedded clauses of quotation.
mudandis, as if we tried to explain the verbal agreement with the subject in European languages by semantic factors and not by syntactic ones.

Thus it is much easier, for example, to explain the pattern of person marking in direct questions by a rule of anticipation (Tournadre 2001, 2003: 94–95), which is linked to the cognitive notion of empathy.

Concerning the ‘quotative conjunct’, another way of explaining the construction is the conservation of the original ending used in the quotation and the replacement of the 1st person pronoun by a 3rd person pronoun.

Let us again consider the example given by DeLancey (1990: 295).

(15) \textit{khos kho bod.pa yin zer gyis}  
\textit{He(ERG) he Tibetan be(EGO) say-IMPF/SENS}$^{44}$  
“\textit{He says that he is a Tibetan}”

It is important to note the existence of an alternative construction given below:

(16) \textit{kho-s nga bod.pa yin zer-gyis}  
\textit{He-ERG I Tibetan be(EGO) say-IMPF+SENS}  
“\textit{He says: I am Tibetan}”

The sentence (16) has the same meaning as (15) but corresponds to a direct quotation.

These constructions are frequent in Literary Tibetan but are less used in colloquial Tibetan$^{45}$.

We can now derive (15) from (16) and interpret the structure of (15) as a shift of pronoun without changing the copula. The fact that traces of the original speaker’s deictic systems are found in the reported speech is not surprising from a typological point of view: “Indirect speech lies half way [...], between direct speech, which ignores the actual speaker’s deictic system, and main clauses [...] which wholly use the system of the speaker”. (Palmer, 1986: 164).

Another alternative construction, even more frequent than (15) and (16) is the following:

(17) \textit{kho bo.d.pa yin zer-gyis}  
\textit{he Tibetan be(EGO) say+IMPF+SENS}  
“\textit{[He$_1$] says that he$_1$ is Tibetan}”. Lit. “\textit{He am Tibetan, says}.”

$^{44}$ The gloss is mine.

$^{45}$ Direct quotations require a specific intonation pattern.
In the above example, the agent of the matrix clause (khos) has been deleted. The reason why (17) is even preferred to (15) has to do the reluctance of Tibetan speakers to have coreferent pronouns in the same sentence. Thus (15) is a marked sentence compared to (17) and could be translated perhaps more accurately as: He says he is Tibetan.

In Tournadre and Dorje (2003: 214–216), I have called constructions such as (17) ‘hybrid reported speech’ which is the most common construction for reported speech in Tibetan.

Hybrid reported speech also interacts with honorific markers (pronoun, noun, adjective, verb, auxiliary) which depends on the actual speaker and not the quoted speaker. The role of honorific in reported speech is sometimes crucial in Classical Tibetan (Tournadre, 1994: 150–153) to identify the grammatical roles.

Another fundamental problem with the c/d analysis, is that it posits a dichotomy between 1st person and 2nd/3rd persons (in the case of “declarative” and “quotative” c/d patterns) and between 2nd person and 1st/3rd persons (in the case of “interrogative” c/d pattern). For example, in Standard Tibetan, the perfective “conjunct form” pa-yin is not opposed to a single disjunct form but to a whole set of evidential markers (song sensory, bzhag inferential, pa red factual, etc.). As also noted by Garrett (2001), a dichotomy is not at all appropriate to describe very complex evidential systems based on semantic and pragmatic factors.

The c/d analysis also fails to explain the numerous violations of the coreference pattern which occur in Tibetic: While ‘declarative conjunct

\[\text{In fact, when I checked this sentence with Sangda Dorje, he proposed the sentence} \]
\[\text{khos kho.rang bod.pa yin zer gyis using the emphatic pronoun kho.rang instead of kho.} \]
\[\text{This sentence seems to be more frequent than (15). Interestingly, Garrett (p.c.) independently supported the idea that the use of the emphatic pronoun is more common.} \]

\[\text{Classical Tibetan does oppose direct and indirect speech. However, Standard Spoken Tibetan mainly uses hybrid and direct constructions. Many languages do not have the opposition between direct speech and indirect speech, found in European languages, but some kind of hybrid constructions. In Literary French, along with direct and indirect speech, one also finds a discours indirect libre “free indirect speech”, which bears some features of both indirect and direct reported speech. Japhug, a rGyalrongic language, has a hybrid indirect speech similar to Tibetan but does not have any construction corresponding to the anticipation in direct question (see Jacques, 2007).} \]

\[\text{In my early articles, I briefly used the opposition egophoric/heterophoric. In my current understanding of the system, I dropped this dichotomic approach and oppose egophoric to all other evidential markers.} \]
forms’ may occur only if a 1st person is involved in the clause ‘declarative disjunct’ forms occur not only with 2nd and 3rd persons but often appear with first person subjects (see above example 9). These cases cannot be considered as “exceptions”, they constitute an essential feature of this evidential system and are very common. In a forthcoming article, Oisel shows that all the ‘disjunct forms’ are in fact nearly always compatible with 1st person subject. Garrett (2001: 44) has shown that counterfactual apodoses can only occur with non egophoric, even with the 1st person. This point is very significant to understand the evidential system of Tibetan or other Tibetic languages, but it remained largely unnoticed.

(18)  shog-bu yod na nga las-ka gzh-an-dag gcig byed gi red / *byed gi yin
paper  ELPA if I work another one do-[IND FUT] / *do-[EGO FUT]
“If I had papers I’d do some other work. [I wouldn’t work in the store.]”

The egophoric forms in the examples 19–22 are unmarked: Perfective:

(19)  nga-s lab-pa.yin
I-ERG tell-PFV+EGOint
“I told (it)/I have told it.”

Perfect:

(20)  nga-s lab-yod
I-ERG tell+PERF+EGOint
“I have told (it).”

Present/Past imperfactive:

(21)  nga-(s) lab-kyi.yod
I-(ERG) tell-PRES+EGOint
“I tell (it), I used to tell (it), I was telling (it).”

Future:

(22)  nga-s lab-kyi.yin
I-ERG tell-FUT+EGOint
“I will tell (it).”

However factual and sensory forms, i.e. the so called “disjunct forms” may also occur if the context is appropriate: Perfective:
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(23) \textit{nga-s lab-pa.red/song}

I-ERG tell-PFV+FACT/PFV+SENS

“I told (it)/I have told it.”

Perfect:

(24) \textit{nga-s lab-bzhag/yod.red}

I-ERG tell-PERF+SENS/PERF+FACT

“I have told (it).”

Present/past imperfective:

(25) \textit{nga-s lab-kyi.yod.red/gi.’dug}

I-ERG tell-IMPF+FACT/IMPF+SENS

“I tell (it), I used to tell (it), I was telling (it).”

Future:

(26) \textit{nga-s lab-kyi.red}

I-ERG tell-FUT+FACT

“I will tell (it).”

Within the scope of this article, we can not consider all the possible situations and contexts that would account for the above sentences. Let us just mention a few possibilities:

a) for sensory markers, the case of self-observation (dreams, mirrors, movies, etc.) or intentionality out of focus (see Oisel, forthcoming), co-observation by the hearer (and search of a consensus by the speaker), etc.

b) for factual markers, statements about distant past or future, polemic statements, etc.

c) for sensory inferential, possible contexts include lack of intention, unawareness, etc.

A final point ought to be mentioned against the notion of “conjunct”. Unlike evidential auxiliaries (or copulas), epistemic auxiliaries (or copulas), which occur in the same paradigm, do not bear any person distinction (see Vokurkova, forthcoming).

(27) \textit{nga-r dngul tog-tsam yod.pa.’dra}

I-DAT money some exist (EPI)

“I have probably some money”
(28)  *khong-la dngul tog-tsam yod.pa.’dra*
He-DAT money some exist (EPI)
“He has probably some money”

(29)  *par ’di nga-s brgyab-a.yod*
picture this I-ERG take-NEG+EPI
“I doubt I took this picture”
(It is an old picture. I forgot who took it, but I doubt it was me).

(30)  *par ’di khong-gis brgyab-a.yod*
picture this he-ERG take-NEG+EPI
“I doubt he took this picture”
(It is an old picture. I forgot who took it, but I doubt it was him).

4 Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to show that the coreference concepts of conjunct and disjunct are not appropriate to describe person marking in Tibetan. Most of the experts on Tibetic languages have specifically chosen not to use this terminology. The semantic and pragmatic notion of ‘egophoric’ related to ‘personal knowledge’ and opposed to other evidentials (sensory, inferential, etc.) is better suited to interpret the linguistic facts.

However, there is no doubt that the phantom concept of conjunct/disjunct will haunt linguistic articles for a long time. Some concepts, once they have appeared are very difficult to eliminate even when they have proven to be wrong. Another clear case is the notion of ‘subject’ when applied to some non Indo-European languages such as Chinese. LaPolla (1993) has brilliantly shown the non-existence of this syntactic category in Chinese but fifteen years later the term “subject” is still found all over in Chinese linguistics . . .
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